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by Alexandra Petermann Reifschneider

Author: Alexandra Petermann Reifschneider
Subcategory: Encyclopedias & Subject Guides
Language: English
Publisher: Edward Elgar Pub (June 30, 2006)
Pages: 283 pages
Category: Reference
Rating: 4.1
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Alexandra Petermann Reifschneider.

Alexandra Petermann Reifschneider. Download (pdf, . 6 Mb) Donate Read. Epub FB2 mobi txt RTF. Converted file can differ from the original. If possible, download the file in its original format.

By ALEXANDRA PETERMANN REIFSCHNEIDER," Economica, London School of Economics and Political .

By ALEXANDRA PETERMANN REIFSCHNEIDER," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 78(309), pages 190-191, January. Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:78:y:2011:i:309:p:190-191. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Alexandra petermann reifschnei. Studies in fiscal federalism and state-local finance. 1 2 3 4 5. Want to Read. Are you sure you want to remove COMPETITION IN THE PROVISION OF LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS: SINGLE FUNCTION JURISDICTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE. from your list? Competition in the provision of local public goods: single function jurisdictions and individual choice. by ALEXANDRA PETERMANN REIFSCHNEIDER.

State and Local Finance in the National Economy. Competition in the Provision of Local Public Goods: Single Function Jurisdictions and Individual Choice. Federalism: Failure and Success, A Comparative Study. Optimal Fiscal Federalism in the Presence of Tax Competition, unpublished paper. Versus Demand-Constrained Systems, Econometrica 47, 801–819. Rhode, P. W. and K. S. Strumpf.

Public finance and public choice economists have contrasting views on. .

I determine that provision of forensic science services at the national level rather than local level does not lead to higher relative cost, and national production may be relatively more efficient.

Single Function Jurisdictions and Individual Choice. Studies in Fiscal Federalism and State–local Finance series. Alexandra Petermann Reifschneider. The central purpose of this book is to analyse the optimal allocation of local public goods or services (for example garbage collection, police, fire brigades and medical services) in large urban agglomerations and the allocation consequences of increasing competition in the provision of them.

The principles of fiscal federalism are concerned with the design of fiscal .

The principles of fiscal federalism are concerned with the design of fiscal constitutions – that is, how taxing, spending, and regulatory functions are allocated among governments and how intergovernmental transfers are structured. Local governments do not have any constitutional status: they are simply extensions of state governments and derive their authority from state governments. In the model of dual federalism, states enjoy significant autonomy from the federal government, and local governments are simply handmaidens of the states and have little or no direct relationship with the federal government.

Club goods and local public goods. 4. anzi, V. and L. Schuknecht Public Spending in the 20th Century: A Global Perspective. Efficiency conditions for public goods. Private provision of public goods. Second-best principle. Imperfect competition and government regulation. Principles of fiscal federalism: club theory and local public goods, Tiebout hypothesis. Production versus finance. The incidence applied to local public finance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). A pure theory of local expenditure’, Journal of Political Economy 64 1956, p. 16–24.

Fiscal FEDERALISM AND FINANCIAL equalisation the Changes in the budgetary . The founder of the theory of public choice George. For each region a standard level of provision of public goods (standard financial need), and tax revenues are calculated at a uniform tax rate.

Fiscal FEDERALISM AND FINANCIAL equalisation the Changes in the budgetary alignment of the Legal basis and organization of fiscal equalization in Ukraine, Horizontal fiscal imbalances and the alignment of the Definition and types of budget federalism fiscal federalism Vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances, FISCAL POLICY of the STATE Financial equalisation mechanisms and budgetary management.

Fiscal federalism in an ideal world . For the provision of such goods to be efficient, three conditions must be satisfied.

Fiscal federalism in an ideal world ~. Ii Perhaps the best way to focus on the efficiency of the American federalist system is to begin with an ideal world in which people and resources are divided among lower levels of government (local jurisdictions) and higher levels of government (either states or the national government). The Efficient Community Provision of Public Services Suppose that the population of a particular jurisdiction is fixed (L. there is no migration) and that households have similar tastes for the public goods that the community is to provide.

The central purpose of this book is to analyze the optimal allocation of local public goods or services (for example garbage collection, police, fire brigades and medical services) in large urban agglomerations and the allocation consequences of increasing competition in the provision of them. Competition in the Provision of Local Public Goods uses two innovative aspects present in the concept of Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions, which are de-localized membership and uni-functionality of jurisdictions. The book analyzes the effect of these two aspects on competition among jurisdictions and the impact this probable increase in competition may have on the achievement of the optimal allocation of local public goods.

The primary audience for this work is academics and researchers in the fields of urban and regional economics, location theory and public policy. An important secondary audience will be scholars of industrial organization, who can use the framework developed here for analyzing other problems related with the location of individuals in space.