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I've been working my way through the Summa Theologica for the last ten years, so I came to "Good and Evil Actions" by Steven J. Jensen with some background in Thomism. While I don't know if that background is necessary to understand or appreciate Jensen's text, I found that Jensen's work deepened my understanding of Aquinas and brought the often dry propositions of the Summa to life with mind-bending conundrums and sharp analysis.

Jensen starts with two fact patterns. In one a mother is in labor and will die unless the obstetrician crushes the too-large head of the baby (the "craniotomy case."). In the other, the mother is found to have cancer of the uterus and will die unless the mother undergoes a hysterectomy, which will obviously kill the baby (the "hysterectomy case.") Is there a difference between these two actions? In both the intention and effect of the operation is that mother lives and the baby dies. Yet, Catholic moral teaching is that the former is not licit but the latter is. The distinction seems to be that the former involves a direct action directly intending to kill and which does kill directly, while the latter doesn't. Determining whether this distinction makes sense - or whether it is mere "hair-splitting casuistry" - and what contours the relevant principles possess is the aim of Jensen's book.

The roadmap for the analysis is the Summa Theologica ("ST"). In the ST, the "species" of an action is determined by the intentions of an actor.(p. 27.) Someone pounding nails makes noise but that's not the intention of the action; someone who shoots a gun off to scare crows away from a crop does intent to make noise. (Id.) But discerning intent is not straightforward, e.g., is the intent of the doctor in the craniotomy case to crush the head, kill the baby or save the mother's life? Obviously on some level, the answer is all of those options. Jensen points out that there are a "dizzying" variety of ways of talking about this issue, but he breaks the issue down to "physicalism" and "Abelardianism." The former examines the issue from the standpoint of the physical actions performed, which necessarily have a close connection to the actor's intent, while the latter looks at only the intent. (p. 17.) "Intention" becomes even more complex in the distinction of finis operis and finis operantis, the end of the action and the end, or motive, of the actor. (p. 28.) The finis operis of a home-builder is the home, but his finis operantis might be the money he makes from the home-owner. It is the finis operis - the end of the action, an end which is objective, as opposed to the subjective finis operantis - that determines teh species of the action, and it is nature that provides the finis operis. Thus, the natural end of sex is the production and rearing of children, which means that the finis operis, the intent of the action, if not of the actor, is the production and rearing of children, which means that actions not in accord with that end are "disordered." (p. 29, De Malo, 15.1)

Jensen's second chapter deals with the issue of intention. According to Aquinas, we intend ends, some of which we choose and some we don't, and we choose means. (p. 48.) For Aquinas, the "experimentum crucis" was the issue of "self-defense." (p. 52.) In the case of self-defense, one fires a gun at an attacker with possibly two intents, preserving one's own life and/or killing the attacker. (p. 53.) Licit self-defense also requires that the force used in self-defense be proportionate to the amount needed to engage in self-defense. Too much and it is no longer self-defense. (This seems to correspond to the previous talk of finis operis and nature inasmuch as excessive force - more than naturally required speaks to an intention other than self-defense.)

In this area also, the hair-splitting becomes fine. We can distinguish between "end intention" and "means intention." Do we determine intention based on the end or the means? Jensen points out that "end intention" has been uniformly rejected, but that means intention carries with it its own difficulties. Ultimately, Jensen concludes that the character of the exterior actions taken in conformity with the intention "specifies" intentions, i.e., takes a broad intention and assists in determining the intents moral qualities.

At some point, in the unthreading of intent and actions, the thought may arise that there is always an exception. Jensen explains Thomas's common sense point of view:

>>>We begin iwth the principle that human laws apply only imperfectly to concrete situations; they cannot cover every possible circumstance. Laws concerning speed limits, for example, can't possibly enumerate all the circumstances in which it might be legitimate to exceed the limit. Similarly, Thomas allows that in case of necessity one can take what (ordinarily) belongs to another, because in need all things are held in common; a starving man can take a loaf of bread if there is no other sustenance available. Since no human law can possibly articulate all the circumstances in which such "theft" is legitimate, one must rely upon one's good judgment to discern when the human law must be set aside on account of some higher principle; Aquinas call this good judgment the virtue of equity (epikeia) or gnome." (p. 64, citing ST I-II, 96, 6, II-II 51, r, II-II 120, 1; II 66, 71, II-II 110, 3 ad 4.)

Jensen's third chapter involves "exterior actions." In this section, Jensen uses the Thomistic model of deliberation from an end to the choice of means in determining the intentions. According to Thomas, intentions and ends are logically prior to choices of means. When a person wants to decide what or how to do something they start from the end, the goal, and reason their way backwards. (p. 85, ST I-II, 14,5.) It is therefore reason, working its way from goal to the last choice necessary to reach the goal to the choice before that and the choice before that to the beginning at the time when the person began to move to the goal, which specifies the intent. (p. 102.) Jensen gives a fascinating account of the role that circumstances play in a variety of situations.

Ultimately, Jensen concludes that determining whether an action is "good" turns on a two piece puzzle:

>>>The species of actions will prove to be a simple two-piece puzzle. On the one hand, there is an order that an agent gives to his actions; on the other hand, there is an order of reason, an order that the action should have. When these two orders agree, then the action is good; when they conflict, the action is evil. The act of murder, for instance, is directed by the gent to the death of his victim: by reason, it is directed to the good of the one acted upon. Since these two orders conflict, the moral species of the action is evil. (p. 130.)

That last statement is puzzling. How is murder "by reason" directed to the good of the one acted upon." The answer is found in Chapter 4 - "Love of Others." According to Jensen and Aquinas, reason dictates that "love" is the goal of any action. There are two kinds of love - the love of the good (concupiscence) and the love of the person (friendship.) Humans are naturally inclined to love other humans because, in essence, we love ourselves and we see in other humans our own "species" which they share with us and so we love with a "natural love." (Like befriends like.) (p. 136.) Jensen explains:

>>>>When we kill another human being it seems we do not love him with a love of friendship, for we seek evil rather than his good. We love him only as a means, as useful for attaining some other good. Killing an innocent human being, then, is evil insofar as it is opposed to our natural love for others, for it treats someone as a means. If the doctor truly kills the child in the craniotomy case, then that action is morally evil.

in general, Abelardianism claims that the natural inclination to love others with a love of friendship is thwarted by intending other's evil. When we will someone's evil, then we cannot possibly be treating him as the subject of the good; his value must be purely instrumental." (p. 136.)

Jensen diverges into an interesting discussion of how we can reach the prohibition against treating others as a means through "equality of justice." "Strict justice" exists only when there is "strict equality." (p. 137.) Kings do not owe strict justice to their subjects; nor do parents owe strict justice to their children. (Id.) But where there is equality, then there is an obligation of justice, and human beings are equal by nature, according to Aquinas, because they exist and were made for their own sakes, not to be directed as a means, to some end.

>>>Nature made all human beings equal in liberty, but not in natural perfection, for according to the Philosopher in book one of the Metaphysics, those are free who exist for their own sakes. According to nature one human being is not ordered to another as an end. (p.138, quoting II Sent. d.44, q.1, a #, ad 1.)

However, this does not lead to atomistic individualism because human beings have a natural affinity for the community of other human beings and are, in fact, part of a community. Conflicts between the community and the individual may arise in which the individual may properly be sacrificed for the greater whole of the community. (p. 148.) Aquinas's conception of the "common good" does not lead to a "soft fascism" because the good of the community is the good of the individual and the "common good" exists for the sake of its "innocent members." A "good" that sacrifices the innocent is not the "good of the greater part." (p. 158 - 159.) Jensen posits a scenario where a soldier must shoot a child to trigger a bomb that will save his brigade (which liberating France in 1944). He explains:

>>>"The soldier, then, cannot claim that his act of killing the child is for the sake of a greater good. It attacks the one greater good that matters, the shared good between innocent human beings. It treats the child as a tool, thereby shattering the unity that constitutes the unity that constitutes the human community. The child is no longer treated as a apart that shares in the good; she is treated as an instrument, cut off from the good, existing to produce the good." (p. 159.)

Interestingly, Jensen would permit the same soldier that tripped the bomb which would kill the same child because in that case, the soldier is not attacking an innocent, but simply not sharing the good with the innocent, and "not sharing" the good is inevitable. Jensen writes:

>>>"Why not? Because it is one thing, an inevitable thing, not to benefit some parts of the common good. It is another, an incoherent thing, to treat a chief part as if it were subordinate and useful for the common good rather than a subject to share the common good. In the latter, we redefine the common good, excluding this person from it; in the former we recognize our limitations. The common good is found in activity, in acts of sharing, not in good results. The common good is undermined in activity, in disordered acts of subordinating, not in bad results, not in bad results. By using a chief part of the common good, we actually separate ourselves from this good." (p. 162.)

Jensen explains further:

>>>"in neither does the soldier share the good with the child; in both, the soldier seeks the good of others instead. Nevertheless, the two differ with regard to the ct of using the child. The first soldier does not seek to bring about a change in the child that is causally instrumental for achieving his goals; rather, he seeks to bring about a change in the bridge, which consequently harms the child. The second soldier plans precisely to harm the child as a means of achieving his goals."

"We need not at all times share the good with everyone, so that the soldiers do not necessarily harm the good through their failure to share the good with a the child. We must not, however subject a chief part of the good for some further purpose. when we subject the good, we treat it no longer as the good, but as a tool or instrument subordinated to the good. We harm by offense, by rejecting the good in preference for something else. Sometimes damage results as a consequence of our action, as with the first soldier, and yet there is no harm of offense; only constitutive harm results. Damage is done but the individual is not subordinated, and the common good is not rejected." (p. 178.)

Jensen's fifth chapter deals with "difficulties" and constitutes a review of issues raised to this point.

Jensen's sixth chapter is "Teleology" which brings together the threads of the book. Ultimately, the account of the morality of human actions is teleological. Jensen explains:

>>>"In these actions we find clearly laid out the two fundamental elements of Aquinas's account of the moral species of human action. Each action has two orders. First the order that the action actually takes on; second, the order that the action should have. When these two orders agree, the action is good; when they conflict, the action is evil. The act of bestiality should be ordered to new human life; it is actually directed not to this end but to some other, such as pleasure." (p. 246.)

Jensen finds the first order from the actions as executed, from the agent's intentions, as conceived and from practical reasoning linking the real caused available to an agent in order to achieve some end. The second order arises from nature and "perhaps from society."

In our post-modern age, this leads to some interesting observations about human flourishing:

>>>"Likewise, human beings are good through an order to human goods. A person is good, for instance, through an order to new human life. This order is to be found first in the natural inclination to new life, but it is realized fully in activity. Human persons are ordered to the good not merely through natural inclinations; they are ordered through human actions, through acts of the will. Moreover, they are normally directed to the good not simply through interior acts of the will but through exterior actions, those acts of the will that belong directly to some external power and tot he will through command, as a directing or primary cause. Someone is ordered to new human life not merely through bodily sexual activity but through voluntary sexual activity. Nor are they fully directed to new human life simply by wanting it or loving it - that is, through interior acts of the will - but through the exterior action of engaging in the power of reproduction."

He who commits bestiality also engages the power of reproduction. To realize the order to new life, however, the activity of this power must be directed upon material fitting, material that is able to bear the form of new life. But his order to new life, which is a human good and makes the person to be good, is seen as an obstacle to the act of bestiality, to the perverse pleasure that the person hopes to gain. He must remove this order, putting another in its place. In short, he sees the order of the human good as a kind of evil." (p. 248 - 249.)

Jensen's final chapter is "moral species," which applies the principles he has outlined previously to particular cases.

In all, I found Jensen's book to be both a great refresher on the Summa, but more importantly, an excellent guide in how Thomistic moral reasoning is to be done. The text is readable but written at a high level. The great virtue of the book is the fact that Jensen provides examples of moral conundrums to illustrate his points, which on the whole made the book quite enjoyable.

This is quite simply the best book that I have read on the specification of good and evil actions in the thought of Thomas Aquinas! Jensen argues that there are two orders to human acts: the order that it does have, and the order that it should have. When these orders agree, an act is good. When they disagree, an act is evil.

The order an action does have is divided up into the act as executed and the act as conceived. The act as executed is specified by intention, since intention functions as one's plan of bringing about a desired goal. The act as conceived is specified by the end toward which we aim and practical reason's perception of the real causes available to bring about this end.

The order an action should have is provided by teleology. All of our actions engage some bodily power with its own natural teleology. This natural teleology functions to direct an action toward some end. Teleology provides a moral standard of action since the human good is *our* good. Actions such as bestiality and lying are wrong because they misdirect an action away from the end that it should have. All evil actions, Jensen argues, can be explained as some failure of teleology. Murder is wrong because the will is oriented toward willing the good of others, an end which murder perverts.

Overall, highly recommended. The writing is clear and concise. The author engages heavily with Aquinas's own writings (even providing the original Latin in the footnotes!), making his interpretation of Aquinas very plausible.

The best book available in English on Aquinas' teaching on the specification of human actions. The doctrine becomes plainer bit by bit.