» » Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy
Download Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy djvu

Download Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy djvu

by Randall W. Stone

Author: Randall W. Stone
Subcategory: Social Sciences
Language: English
Publisher: Cambridge University Press; 1 edition (March 31, 2011)
Pages: 274 pages
Category: Other
Rating: 4.1
Other formats: mbr lrf lrf doc

PDF On Dec 12, 2016, Philip G. Cerny and others published Randall W. Stone, Controlling Institutions: International . and the Global Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. xvi + 256

and the Global Economy. xvi + 256, ISBN 978-1-10700-540-2 (hbk). University of Manchester and Rutgers University. Global governance and international organisations have taken some serious knocks. Indeed, in a recent issue of Governance, David Coen and Tom Pegram argue.

How are the rules of the global economy made? This book shows how a combination of formal and informal rules explain how international organizations really work. Randall W. Stone argues that formal rules apply in ordinary times.

Controlling Institutions. International Organizations and the Global Economy. Stone, Randall W. 2013. Informal governance in international organizations: Introduction to the special issue.

Politics in international organizations does not follow formal rules

Politics in international organizations does not follow formal rules. Through studies of the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization and the European Union, Randall W. Stone shows how informal power explains variations in institutional design, performance and legitimacy, and explains how international organizations really function.

Controlling Institutions book. Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Start by marking Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. ant to Read.

Randall W. Stone (born February 21, 1966) is an American political scientist and a professor at the University of Rochester, notable for his . Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy. Stone (born February 21, 1966) is an American political scientist and a professor at the University of Rochester, notable for his studies on international political economy, international relations, and Russian and European politics.

On July 20, we had the largest server crash in the last 2 years. Full recovery of all data can take up to 2 weeks! So we came to the decision at this time to double the download limits for all users until the problem is completely resolved. Thanks for your understanding! Progress: 8. 2% restored. Главная Controlling Institutions: International Organization and the Global Economy.

Home Randall W. Stone Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the. This book shows how a combination of formal and informal rules explain how international organizations really work.

Home Randall W. Stone argues that formal rules apply in ordinary times, while informal power allows leading states to exert control when the stakes are high. International organizations are therefore best understood as equilibrium outcomes that balance the power and interests of the leading state and the member countries.

Controlling Institutions : International Organizations and the Global Economy.

How is the United States able to control the IMF with only 17% of the votes? How are the rules of the global economy made? This book shows how a combination of formal and informal rules explain how international organizations really work. Randall W. Stone argues that formal rules apply in ordinary times, while informal power allows leading states to exert control when the stakes are high. International organizations are therefore best understood as equilibrium outcomes that balance the power and interests of the leading state and the member countries. Presenting a new model of institutional design and comparing the IMF, WTO and EU, Stone argues that institutional variations reflect the distribution of power and interests. He shows that US interests influence the size, terms and enforcement of IMF programs, and new data, archival documents and interviews reveal the shortcomings of IMF programs in Mexico, Russia, Korea, Indonesia and Argentina.