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by Christopher Elliott

Author: Christopher Elliott
Subcategory: Humanities
Language: English
Publisher: Oxford University Press; 1 edition (March 1, 2015)
Pages: 286 pages
Category: Other
Rating: 4.3
Other formats: lrf docx mbr doc

Christopher L. Elliott retired from the British Army as a Major General in 2002

Christopher L. Elliott retired from the British Army as a Major General in 2002. See all Product description. Christopher L. Elliott. Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan, 2001–2014.

Christopher L. The book stimulated me to anger. In the 21st century we have had pigmy ministers of defence until 2010 led by two PM's who were both charlatans

Christopher L. In the 21st century we have had pigmy ministers of defence until 2010 led by two PM's who were both charlatans. The book' lesson for me is that the British People and especially their troops deserve better staff officers.

The Project for the New American Century (1997-2006) and the post-Cold War ‘Neoconservative Moment’ Twenty years ago the Project for the New American Century, a controversial neoconservative think tank whose main objective was the promotion of American leadership in the world, was born. Founded in 1997, the PNAC played an important role in disseminating the latest generation neoconservative.

In his book High Command, Christopher Elliott analyses the UK’s erroneous decision to participate in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars in the previous . Having served in the British Army and later in the UK Ministry of Defence.

In his book High Command, Christopher Elliott analyses the UK’s erroneous decision to participate in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars in the previous decade without a clear strategy and with limited resources. Elliott has focussed on the process that led individually capable and competent operators to collectively take rather ordinary decisions. The result was that the process subjugated both the institutions and the individuals.

In his book, General Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable.

From 2001, Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In his book, General Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented

From 2001, Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Victory in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. In his book, General Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. Victory" in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust.

Find many great new & used options and get the best deals for High Command: British Military Leadership in the . From 2001, Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination.

High Command : British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. by Christopher Elliott.

and significant loss of life for our servicemen and women.

From 2001, Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. "Victory" in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated.In his book, General Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable. Often the opinion of a junior tactical commander led the entire strategy of the MoD, not the other way around, as it should have been. While Britain's senior officers, defense ministers and civil servants were undeniably competent and well intentioned, the conundrum remains why success on the battlefield proved so elusive.