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by Terence Cuneo

Author: Terence Cuneo
Subcategory: Humanities
Language: English
Publisher: Clarendon Press; 1 edition (October 25, 2007)
Pages: 260 pages
Category: Other
Rating: 4.8
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Find books By contrast, The Normative Web provides not merely a defense of robust realism in ethics, but a positive argument for this position.

Terence Cuneo argues that moral and epistemic facts are sufficiently similar so that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological scepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts do exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true. By contrast, The Normative Web provides not merely a defense of robust realism in ethics, but a positive argument for this position. In so doing, it engages with a range of antirealist positions in epistemology such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons.

Terence Cuneo argues that all possible meta-etpistemic alternatives to epistemic realism are implausible: Epistemic .

Terence Cuneo argues that all possible meta-etpistemic alternatives to epistemic realism are implausible: Epistemic error theory, expressivism, and reductionism are all rejected by Cuneo. I will consider Cuneo’s main argument and provide my objections to it. My main objection to Cuneo’s argument is that it could be be incomplete.

And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true

Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts do not exist. An interesting question to raise about these views is whether they imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic facts, do not exist. This book develops the argument that they do. That is, it contends that moral and epistemic facts are sufficiently similar that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts also do not exist. But epistemic facts (facts that concern reasons for belief), it is argued, do exist. So, moral facts also exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true More. Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts do not exist.

Terence Cuneo has written a powerful defense of moral realism. This is a great idea for a book and Cuneo does it justice: it ought to be ready by anyone concerned with metaethics or with issues regarding normativity in general

Terence Cuneo has written a powerful defense of moral realism. This is a great idea for a book and Cuneo does it justice: it ought to be ready by anyone concerned with metaethics or with issues regarding normativity in general. The structure of the argument is clear, the methodology is straightforward, and each premise has a prima facie plausibility that only deepens as the book progresses.

The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true

The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that the similarities between moral and epistemic facts provide excellent reason to believe that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts, it is argued, do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological skepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts exist. In so arguing, Cuneo provides not simply a defense of moral realism, but a positive argument for it.

Terence Cuneo, someone . 5) So moral realism is true. Cuneo's defence of the crucial first premise focuses on certain key features that anti-realists have found objectionable about moral facts and the moral reasons they invoke.

Terence Cuneo, someone already identified by those who have been paying attention as a young moral philosopher to watch, has written a splendid book. The core idea is not a novel one and has received the occasional airing, a sentence here, a paragraph there, in the literature. But Cuneo is the first that I've noticed to really pick this particular ball up and have a real shot at running with it over some distance. These objectionable features are as follows

Moral realism (also ethical realism or moral Platonism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that . 1, section 9 : The argument from Queerness. Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

Moral realism (also ethical realism or moral Platonism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.

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The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism (Oxford, 2007). Terence Cuneo and Rene Van Woudenberg (Cambridge, 2004). Practices of Belief, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Ed. Terence Cuneo (Cambridge, 2010). Inquiring about God, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Ed. Foundations of Ethics, Ed. Russ Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo (Blackwell, 2007). Philosophy Come to Dinner: Arguments on the Ethics of Eating, Ed. Andrew Chignell, Terence Cuneo, Matthew Halteman (Routledge, forthcoming). Moral Realism" In Christian Miller, ed. The Continuum Companion to Ethics (Continuum, 2011).

Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts or truths do not exist. Does this imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic facts, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that moral and epistemic facts are sufficiently similar so that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological scepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts do exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true.It is sometimes said that moral realists rarely offer arguments for their position, settling instead for mere defenses of a view they find intuitively plausible. By contrast, The Normative Web provides not merely a defense of robust realism in ethics, but a positive argument for this position. In so doing, it engages with a range of antirealist positions in epistemology such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons. These positions, Cuneo claims, come at a prohibitively high theoretical cost. Given this cost, it follows that realism about both epistemic and moral facts is a position that we should find highly attractive.